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Introduction: Transnational Elements of 
Constitution-Making
Gregory Shaffer∗
This issue of the UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational and Comparative 
Law examines the transnational aspects of constitution-making. Constitutions are 
conventionally viewed as providing the basic norms for the structure of the state, 
its institutions and laws. They can also create important symbols for the state and 
its citizens, differentiating them from another, and thus becoming a source of 
national identity. Yet, paradoxically, constitutions in significant part are 
transnationally constructed. They are transnational legal orders in so far as they 
reflect similar structures and norms that transcend and diffuse across nation-states. 
The symposium consists of five articles addressing the transnational 
construction of national constitutions. The first, by Tom Ginsburg, interrogates the 
relation of Constitutional Advice and Transnational Legal Order. Ginsburg surveys the 
historical practice of providing constitutional advice transnationally. He shows how 
today transnational institutions, such as the United Nations and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), are central players in the social field of constitution-making. 
He asks whether the resulting constitutions can be viewed as part of a transnational 
legal order (TLO), as defined in the work of Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer.1
Halliday and Shaffer define a transnational legal order as “a collection of formalized 
legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the 
understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions.”2 Ginsburg’s work 
shows that common legal norms structure the institutions and laws of states across 
jurisdictions. As he stresses, “the field is an inherently transnational one, and . . . it 
is becoming increasingly institutionalized as transnational.”3 Yet, Ginsburg also 
notes that actors use constitution-making to advance distinct transnational legal 
orders for human rights, rule of law, and other issues. In this way, constitution-
making becomes “an arena in which other TLOs contest over outcomes” within 
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their subject areas.4 Ginsburg concludes that the study of constitution-making 
recursively can help advance TLO theory as it sharpens its analytical tools for 
application to new domains. 
In the second article, A Transnational Actor on a Dramatic Stage—Sir Ivor Jennings 
and the Manipulation of Westminster Style of Democracy: The Case of Pakistan, H. 
Kumarasingham describes how a single figure can influence constitution-making as 
a norm entrepreneur across the world. Sir Ivor Jennings played a central role in the 
writing of Pakistan’s constitution, part of a transnational trend in the 1940s of new 
states adopting the “Westminster model” of constitutions. Jennings worked across 
Africa and Asia to provide advice on constitution-building, where he promoted 
Westminster conventions. In Pakistan, he arguably played his most controversial 
role where he developed legal rationales in support of a “constitutional coup” by 
the Governor-General against the Constituent Assembly, in part to counter Islamic 
influence in the Constituent Assembly. This episode created a legacy for future 
coups and military dominance in Pakistan. As Kumarasingham concludes, 
“Jennings was decisively able as a legal-political actor to adopt Westminster legal 
forms and draw on the transnational body of common law and royal powers to 
selectively bring ‘order’ to the ‘problem’ of avoiding democracy in Pakistan.”5 He 
later drew on this “Pakistan formula. . . for other states around the world that he 
advised—primarily, as was the case in Pakistan, to frustrate, if not suspend, the will 
of parliament to the advantage of unelected elites.”6
The third article, by Paul Craig, Transnational Constitution-Making: The 
Contribution of the Venice Convention on Law and Democracy, brings us to the present, 
assessing the role of the Venice Commission—formally named the European 
Commission for Democracy through Law—in constitution-making today. Like the 
European Court of Human Rights, the Venice Commission is an institution within 
the Council of Europe. It consists, however, of sixty-one member states, including 
the forty-seven members of the Council of Europe. Craig shows how constitution-
making, which he broadly conceives in terms of formation, amendment, 
constitutional legislation and practice, forms an important part of the Commission’s 
work. The Commission issues opinions regarding different phases of constitution-
making in member states.7 Although it is not easy to measure the Commission’s 
causal impact, Craig highlights the diverse forms of its transnational contribution to 
constitution-making. Craig is a member of the Commission, and he responds to 
various critiques of the Commission’s work. 
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The fourth article, by David Landau, Democratic Erosion and Constitution-Making 
Moments: The Role of International Law, addresses transnational responses to abuses of 
constitution-making aimed at eroding democracy, such as in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe in recent years. Landau stresses that constitution-making often 
takes place during crises, when existing domestic institutions have eroded, 
collapsed, or are viewed by revolutionary leaders as illegitimate. He notes that when 
“constitution-makers step outside of the existing political order, there is no other 
obvious source of restraint.”8 Various forms of international interventions thus 
have been developed. Landau evaluates the strengths and drawbacks of four models 
of international intervention to advance democracy: (i) democracy clauses in treaties 
that create obligations on states, such as in the Inter-American Democratic Charter 
and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance; (ii) 
international norms governing the procedure and substance of constitution-making, 
such as the norm of public participation; (iii) international organizations and 
transnational non-governmental organizations diffusing best practices; and (iv) 
international review of constitutional texts and processes by supranational advisory 
bodies, such as the Venice Convention. Landau advocates combining these various 
mechanisms to seek realistic and incremental progress to check abuses in 
constitution-making within states. 
The symposium concludes with Abrak Saati’s article Participatory Constitution-
Making as a Transnational Legal Norm: Why Does it “Stick” in Some Contexts and Not in 
Others?9 Saati assesses the diffusion of the transnational legal norm of participatory 
constitution-making, and how it has affected practice within states. This 
transnational norm has been increasingly conveyed by international organizations 
in transitioning and post-conflict states to create greater local ownership of the 
constitution-making process and the resulting texts and institutions. Key 
transnational actors include the United Nations through its Department of Political 
Affairs, the United States Institute of Peace, and the NGO International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Saati explains how the process 
worked in a series of countries, including in Afghanistan, Colombia, East Timor, 
Eritrea, and South Africa. The South African process serves as a reference point 
which transnational actors convey to spread the norm. 
Constitutions define national legal orders and help catalyze the creation of a 
national sense of identity. Yet, this symposium shows how they are also arenas for 
transnational actors to advance legal norms and structures. We thus can view 
constitutional forms and legal norms as forming part of larger transnational legal 
orders. By instantiating the settlement of legal structures and norms across national 
jurisdictions, constitutions contribute to legal ordering that transcends the nation-
state.
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